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The focus of this thesis is the investigation of legal
criteria governing resolution of construction contract
disputes involving notice requirements and oral change
orders. The current construction contract law literature
directed at the construction contract administrator is
reviewed and synopsized. The purpose of the applicable
contract requirements and relevant issues are discussed.
Rules of application distilled from case lau/ are presented
u/ith reference citations. The rules are verified by further
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The attitude of the judicial system tou/ards contract
formation provides the basis for understanding hou/
construction contracts are interpreted u/hen a dispute
arises. As stated by Su/eet,
Generally, American law gives autonomy to contracting
parties to choose the substantive content of their
contracts. Since most contracts are economic
exchanges, giving parties autonomy allou/s each to value
the other's performance. To a large degree autonomy
assumes and supports a market place vi/here participants
are free to pick the parties u/ith u/hom they deal and
the terms upon u/hich they u/ill deal.^
The importance of this judicial altitude is that courts u/ill
seek to enforce the provisions of the construction contract.
In almost every construction contract, there are
procedural requirements regarding houy and u/hen knowledge is
communicated about situations that may affect project costs
and schedule. For instance, there are provisions requiring
the contractor to notify the owner in writing should the
contractor encounter unanticipated events or circumstances
that may lead to an increase in cost to the owner or that
may delay the timely completion of the project. Further, it
is required that all change orders be in writing. At the
outset, it should be stated that the courts will enforce
these provisions unless it has been found that the
requirement has been waived by the owner. However, there

are a number of u/ays that the requirements can be satisfied
aside from a strict adherence to the technical requirements.
Therefore, it is important that both the ovjuner and
contractor understand these conditions.
Objectives
The objective of this paper is to define the
requirements related to tu/o important notification
mechanisms in construction contracts. These
mechanisms are:
1. The requirement imposed on the contractor to notify
the ovuner that conditions or events have occurred
that may affect the outer's project costs or may
delay project completion.
2. The requirement that all change orders be in
u/riting.
The paper discusses the conditions under which a u/aiver
occurs and the various u/ays in u/hich u/ritten communications
requirements can be satisfied. In both situations, the
necessary conditions may have occurred without the au/areness
of either party. Knowledge of these situations is an
essential prerequisite for good contract administration.
There are several reasons for this paper. Certainly
there is literature available addressing these topics.
However, much of this material is vague and confusing and is

not readily understood by those involved in contract
administration. In some instances, the requirements are
superficially or simplistically presented often misleading
the reader. Sadly, these misunderstandings sometimes
promote rather than minimize disputes. There is a belief by
many involved in the construction process that courts are
arbitrary and that the outcome of a dispute cannot be
predicted u/ith reasonable certainty. This paper is u/ritten
in part to demonstrate that careful case lau/ research shou/s
consistent and predictable application of the law.
Organization of the Paper
This paper is organized in two major parts. The first
part addresses notice requirements and the second covers the
issue of written change orders. Each section begins by
citing the pertinent contract provisions from four standard
contract forms. Then, the important issues raised in the
literature are discussed. Next, several key court cases are
detailed, and from these case studies, specific rules of
application are developed. Finally, these rules are tested





PURPOSE AND RELEVANT ISSUES
Purpose of Written Notice
The ouTier has the right to know his liability for that
item for u/hich he has bargained. Contractually, the ou/ner
preserves this right by requiring the contractor to notify
the ou/ner in u/riting should situations occur that may
increase project costs to the ou/ner or may delay completion.
As stated by an Illinois court,
In a building and construction situation, both the
ou/ner and the contractor have interests that must be
kept in mind and protected. . .The ou/ner has a right to
full and good faith performance of the contractor's
promise, but has no right to expand the nature and
extent of the contractor's obligation. On the other
hand, the ou/ner has a right to know the nature and
extent of his promise, and a right to know the extent
of his liabilities before they are incurred. Thus, he
has a right to be protected against the contractor
voluntarily going ahead with extra work at his expense.
He also has a right to control his own liabilities.
Therefore, the law required his consent be evidenced
before he can be charged for an extra.
^
Additionally, the court of Appeals of North Carolina
stated:
We are not blind to tlie possibility that the Contractor
in this case encountered considerably changed
conditions and extra work. But the position of the
Contractor must be balanced against the Commission's
compelling need to be notified of "changed conditions"
or "extra work" problems and oversee the cost records
for the work in question. The notice and record-
keeping procedures of these provisions are not
oppressive or unreasonable; to the contrary, they are
dictated by considerations of accountability and sound
fiscal policy. The State should not be obligated to

pay a claim for additional compensation unless it is
given a reasonable opportunity to insure that the claim
is based on accurate determinations of u/ork and cost.
The notice and record-keeping requirements constitute
reasonable protective measures, and the Contractor's
failure to adhere to these requirements is necessarily
a bar to recovery for additional compensation.
2
There is consistency among the courts that notice
should allou/ the ou/ner to:
1. Investigate the situation to determine the character
and scope of the problem.
2. Develop appropriate strategies to resolve the
problem. He may choose to redesign portions of the
u/ork and issue the required change order, solicit
bids from the contractor or other contractors on
various alternatives, or delete portions of the
u/ork.
3. Monitor the effort and document the contractor
resources used to perform the u/ork.
4. Remove interferences that may be limiting the
contractor's ability to perform the u;ork.
Often, especially u/here there are changed or differing
site conditions, the ou/ner cannot correct the problem. For
example, if during construction of a building foundation or
embankment, unsuitable soil is found, notice allou/s the
ou/ner to investigate the site and perhaps redesign the
foundation or adjust the alignment. If no alternative is
available, the ou/ner has the opportunity to negotiate a
price in advance or, if unsuccessful, document the

contractor's effort and costs so that any additional costs
to the ou/ner u/ill not be based solely on the contractor's
records. Thus, notice provisions place the ou/ner and
contractor at parity u/ith respect to determining facts and
resolving issues arising from potential claims.
^
Another essential element of notice is the assertion by
the contractor that the u/ork is beyond the contract scope,
and the contractor expects additional compensation or time.
Griping or mere discussions are not sufficient notice as it
is not the responsibility of the ou/ner to determine u/hy
additional expenses or delays are being incurred.
Contractor notice may also alert the ou/ner to other
problems. For example, u/here there is a delay, the ou/ner
may not be aware of the impact of certain actions/inactions
by the ounier or third parties on the contractor's ability to
perform the u/ork. Notice provides an early opportunity to
correct the situation before it develops into a more serious
problem and to alert the ou/ner of possible constructive
changes. Many disagreements occur gradually during the
course of discussions. Notice must be provided u/hen the
contractor believes subsequent decisions have altered the
contract requirements. For instance, consider a case before
the Veterans Administration Board of Contract Appeals
involving a dispute over the installation of fluorescent
lighting fixtures at a neu/ hospital facility. Interferences
and location problems u/ere encountered, and numerous

discussions u/ere held at the field level to decide on an
installation method. The Board stated:
In the circumstances of the instant case, u/here the
parties were, in effect, jointly trying to find a
mutually agreeable method of installing (lighting)
fixtures, the need for a clear prompt notice of a claim
is evident. Otherwise it is u/ell nigh impossible to
determine u/hen the give and take of routine discussion
left off and the battle lines u/ere clearly and
irrevocably drau/n."
When unforeseen events occur, contractors often are not
fully au/are of the conditions or the impact on their ability
to perform the u/ork. A situation that begins as a differing
site condition can cause a delay and may later develop into
a claim. Therefore, it is recommended that a contractor
submit an initial notice that references all of the relevant
contract clauses.
Contract Language
The contract language is of paramount importance. The
follou/ing four standard contract forms are typical of those
most likely to be encountered by small- and medium-size
contractors involved in commercial and highway construction.
1. American Institute of Architects (AIA), A201, 1976.
2. Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), 1985.
3. Engineers Joint Contract Document Committee ( EJCDC )
,
1910-8. 1983.
4. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of
Transportation (PennCOT), Form 408, 1983.

8Each of the above contract documents are similar relative to
types of situations requiring notice. The main differences
are in the time limits and u/hat must be communicated.
The essential elements contained in most notice
provisions are:
1. Form of communication
2. To u/hom to direct notice
3. Time limit for submission
4. Assertion that additional compensation or time is
expected
5. Procedure to be follou/ed or reference to the changes
clause for guidance
Problems requiring notice come from many sources and require
a general clause addressing the notice requirements. The
most common situations requiring notice are:
1. Changed or differing site conditions
2. Directives to do extra u/ork
3. Delays
4. Intent to submit a claim
Items 1 through 3 are problems requiring notice u/hile item 4
is further notice to the ou/ner that his initial
interpretation is not acceptable to the contractor and a
claim for additional compensation and/or time will be
submitted.
Identification of these problems and their coordination
u/ithin the contract documents deserves further discussion.

Figure 1 shovjus the applicable paragraphs from each of the
four standard contract forms. It is important that both
parties revieu/ the contract in its entirety because the
requirements in the various paragraphs may be different.
- It is often alleged that contracts drafted by various
professional associations and agencies contain terms that
are more favorable to the members of the respective
organization. 5 Hou/ever , a review of the specification
requirements indicates that relative to notice, there is no
apparent favoritism. Tables 1 through 4 summarize the
specification requirements of the four standard contracts
forms listed above.
Relative to changed or differing site conditions (DSC),
Table 1 shou/s the AIA document requires notice u/ithin 20
days. The FAR and EJCDC documents require prompt notice.
The AIA, FAR, and EJCDC documents further require that the
notice must be made before conditions are disturbed or
before proceeding u/ith the u/ork. In each instance, the
notice must describe the conditions at variance u/ith the
contract documents. The FennDOT document does not have a
DSC clause. Often the absence of a Differing Site
Conditions clause reflects an ounier ' s policy decision that
contingency costs are to be anticipated by the contractor
and must be built into the contractor's initial bid.
































Comparison of American Institute of Architects (AIA)
Standard Specification (c) 1976
Requirements Involving Notice
Situation
& Document Notice I Contract
Reference Element 1 Requirement
Changed Form I N\A
Conditions To Whom ! N\A
A201, Time Limit I 20 days





Expectation of Form I Written
Compensation To Whom ! Architect
for Extra Work Time Limit ! 20 days
A201, Add'l $ ! Yes
Para. 12.3.1 Expected !
Other ! Para. 10.3
References !
Delay Form 1 Written
A201, To Whom ! Architect
Para. 8.3.2 Time Limit I 20 days




Intent to Form I Written
File a Claim To Whom ! Other Party
A201, Time Limit ! Reasonable Time












& Document Notice Contract !
Reference Element Requirement 1
Changed Form Written 1
Conditions To Whom Contracting Officer 1
52.236-2 (1985) Time Limit Promptly before disturbance!




Expectation of Form Written !
Compensation To Whom Contracting Officer !
for Extra Work Time Limit 20 days !





Delay Form Written !
52.212-12 (1985) To Whom Contracting Officer I
Time Limit 20 days !




Intent to Form ! Written 1
File a Claim To Whom Contracting Officer !
52.233-1 (1985) Time Limit ! N\A !
Add'l $ Yes !
Expected





Comparison of Engineers Joint Contract Document Committee
(EJCDC) Standard Specification (1983)
Requirements Involving Notice
Situation
& Document Notice Contract !
Reference Element Requirement !
Changed Form i Written 1
Conditions To Whom Ovjyner & Engineer !
Standard Form Time Limit Promptly before disturbance!
1910-8, Add ' 1 $ Yes !
Para. 4.3.2 Expected
Other Para(s). 6.20, 6.22 i
References Articles 11, 12 !
Expectation of Form Written I
Compensation To Whom Other party & Engineer !
for Extra Work Time Limit 30 days !
Standard Form Add'l $ Yes • 1
1910-8, Expected
Para. 11.2 Other Para. 9.11 !
References
Delay Form Written !
Standard Form To Whom Other party & Engineer !
1910-8, Time Limit 30 days !
Para. 12.1 Add'l $
Expected
Yes 1
Other Para. 9.11 1
References
Intent to 'Form I Written 1
File a Claim To Whom Other party & Engineer !
Standard Form !Time Limit ! 30 days 1
1910-8, Add'l $ Yes 1






Comparison of Pennsylvania Department of Transportation
(PennDOT) Standard Specification (1983)
Requirements Involving Notice
I Situation
I & Document [ Notice [ Contract
I Reference Element [ Requirement
I Changed Form 1 N/A
[Conditions To Whom [ DSC Clause not
Time Limit I included in




[Expectation of Form [ Oral / Written
[Compensation To Whom [Inspector / District Engr
.
! for Extra Work Time Limit [ Immediately / 2 days
1 Specifications Add'l $ [ Yes
IPara. 110.03(e) Expected
Other [ Section 105.01
References
[Delay Form [ Oral / Written
1 (As amended To Whom [ Inspector / Engineer (s)
[Sept. '83) Time Limit [ 10 days





1 Intent to Form [ Written
[File a Claim To Whom [ Chief Highway Engineer
[Specifications Time Limit [ 10 days
[Para. 105.01 Add'l $
Expected
[ Yes




price/volume bids which allow more flexibility for DSC
conditions
.
Situations may arise where it is difficult to
distinguish a changed condition from a directive to perform
extra work. Table 2 highlights several inconsistencies
within the contract documents. The FAR and EJCDC documents
require prompt notice for changed conditions and 30 days
for extra work. When performing work for PennDOT, written
notice must be given within two business days. The AIA
document avoids any inconsistency because the same clause
covers extras and changed conditions.
Likewise, it is often difficult to separate situations
that will lead to increased costs from those that may cause
a delay. Table 3 shows notice requirements for delays. The
AIA provisions for delays, extras, and changed conditions
are consistent. The timing requirements for the other
documents are not the same. The PennDOT specification
differs in one important respect. The section General
Conditions Concerning Delay Claims, Section 111.02,
specifically identifies proper record keeping as the reason
that notice must be provided. By not mentioning all four of
the purposes of notice and instead focusing attention on
only one, the owner might be limiting his rights regarding
notice. If the contractor keeps proper records but does not
provide notice, the owner may have difficulty establishing
that the contractor has not complied with the notice
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requirement. None of the cases researched considered this
issue
.
Table 4 addresses the question of whether the
contractor must notify the ovjuner of his intent to file a
claim. The importance of this requirement will become
apparent later; hou/ever, it is evident that only the EJCDC
requires the notice to be this specific.
Important Issues Relative to Notice
Often, contractors are reluctant to give notice of
apparent delays or other directives because they do not u/ant
to create a project environment of mistrust or antagonism.
Frequent notices of delays and disputes may create the
impression that the contractor is preparing a major claim.
^
Yet, failure to provide notice u/ill usually result in the
contractor forfeiting the right to additional compensation
or a time extension. There are numerous writings that
discuss notice requirements. The important issues are
highlighted below.
Waiver
Waiver is an important issue in deciding if notice
requirements will be enforced. According to Anson's Law of
Contract, an owner by his own actions can effectively waive
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his right to insist that the contractor perform in
accordance u/ith the contract requirements.'' While there
have been complaints that u/aiver cannot be applied unless
the ou/ner receives some consideration from the contractor in
exchange for giving up this right, Anson states that the
courts have upheld this position on the basis of equity and
have compared u/aiver to equitable estoppel. The doctrine of
estoppel prevents the ou/ner from insisting upon strict
compliance of the contract requirements by the contractor
where the ou/ner
'
s actions have clearly been in conflict u'ith
the same requirements.
The decision of the U. S. Supreme Court in Plumley v.
United States^ is generally regarded as a landmark case
providing for strict interpretation of the notice
requirement. Hou/ever , there is a substantial body of case
law u/here the strict compliance has not been enforced.
Logan states that courts have been willing to bend notice
requirements where equity mandates such a result and where
there has been no prejudice.^ The case of Hoel-Steffen
Construction Company v. United States, 456 F.2d 760, is
often cited to indicate that notice requirements are viewed
as mere technicalities and the courts seek ways to avoid
strict enforcement. The refusal to enforce forfeiture has
been based on the doctrines of waiver or estoppel. That is
to say, the courts have found that the owner had committed
such acts, or the course of conduct between the parties had
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been such that, in equity and good conscience, contractual
provisions for forfeiture could not be asserted against the
Contractor .^ °
Perhaps the most common way an ovi/ner can u/aive notice
requirements is to pay the contractor for previous change
order u/ork u/here notice vi/as not given. If previously
ignored, the contractor u/ill have been led to believe that
the provision u/ill not be enforced, and the notice
requirement cannot be reapplied unless the contractor has
been notified.
Is the Requirement Waivable?
VJhere there are statutory requirements for u/ritten
notice, the requirements cannot be u/aived. This is seldom
the situation, except as it relates to oral change orders on
public contracts.
Qjjner Knowledge
Contractors frequently assert that the ou/ner u/as aware
of the events leading to increased cost or delay, and
therefore, the written notice requirements should not be
enforced. The extent of knowledge can vary. For instance,
in Schnip Building Co. v. United States, ^^ the owner
representative was present daily, was fully aware that

19
additional costs u/ere being incurred, and yet the contractor
was unable to recover. The court felt that it u/as not the
role of the government to ascertain if the additional costs
vuere caused by alleged differing site conditions or improper
construction methods. Hou/ever , in U/eeshoff Construction Co.
V. Los Angeles County Flood Control District, 12 the
contractor recovered because the avi/arding agency kneu/ that a
site inspector was directing that changes be made. The
difference between the cases is the ability of U/eeshoff to
show that the owner knew that work outside the contract
requirements was being accomplished and that the contractor
expected additional compensation. If the contractor can
show such knowledge by the owner, the formal notice
requirement may be waived. This is especially true if the
problem is the owner's fault or something within his
control .1
3
Some courts have held the owner responsible if it can
be shown that the owner should have known of the problem.
One court has held that the form of the contractor's
statements and objections made at meetings and requests for
reconsideration of the government's rejection of submittals
was sufficient notice. i"
Oral and constructive notice are frequently discussed
in the literature. For example, in Hoel-Steffen
Construction Co. v. United States, 1= the contractor orally
complained and stated his intent to file a claim. But, in
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another case, the contractor's claim u/as rejected because
notice was characterized as griping rather than formal
notice, and no intent to file a claim u/as ever asserted. i*-
Constructive notice can occur in job site correspondence and
in other documents. In one case, a document drafted by the
government agent clearly indicated the agent's knowledge and
was determined to be sufficient notice. ^"^ Critical path
method (CPM) schedule updates have been found adequate to
alert the owner of a delay. In Vanderlinde Electric v. City
of Rochester, it was determined that monthly updates kept
the owner fully and continuously aware of delays. ^^
However, nonperiodic or mere submission of updates may not
be adequate .^ ^
One author has suggested that the type of claim can be
a factor in determining if the owner knew. With regard to
delays, it is stated that:
Notice requirements are frequently not enforced
against contractors because the owner is already well
aware of the delay and suffers no prejudice due to the
lack of notice. In the matter of differing site
conditions, the opposite is true. The owner can almost
always show that it suffered prejudice due to lack of
prompt notice; so the requirement is almost always




When the owner is afforded the timely opportunity to
resolve the problem, mitigate damages, or document
contractor costs, then he has not been prejudiced. UTiere
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the ou/ner has not been prejudiced, courts u'ill usually set
aside the formal requirements for u/ritten notice. In one
decision, the contractor u/as able to recover despite the
lack of notice because the ou/ner had no alternative course
of action. 2 1 in that case, the dispute involved highly
technical matters. The supervising architect, vji/ho u/as also
the government's technical expert, u;as au/are of the
problems, but failed to communicate these to the authorized
government representative. The Board felt that the
government u;as not prejudiced because it u/ould have merely
referred the matter back to the supervising architect.
Hou/ever , such instances are not common.
Apparent Authority
As a general rule, communication of delays and problems
affecting costs must be made to the person having the
authority to initiate or issue changes. Communications to
others may result in the claim being denied. The lau/ is
very difficult to analyze in this area. Caution suggests
that a contractor obtain the approval of a corporate officer
(in a private case) or an executive officer of a public




Most standard construction contracts require notice
u-'ithin a specified time limit or promptly upon recognition
of the changed condition. Sometimes, contracts will require
notice u/ithin a reasonable time. This nebulous requirement
places considerable burden on the courts to determine u/hat
is reasonable. Nevertheless, after-the-fact notice u/ill not
likely be judged as reasonable. However, courts are more
lenient with late notice that is only a few days beyond the
specified limit, so long as the owner has not been
prejudiced. 2 2
Repetition of Events
Once notice is given, no further notice is required
when the same conditions recur throughout the job. 2
3
Form of Communication
The owner's knowledge that extra work was being
performed can be either actual or imputed. Knowledge can be
imputed from Critical Path Method (CPM) schedule updates
that serve to keep the owner "fully and continuously
aware. "2 " However, if the updates contain errors, are
inaccurate representations of job progress, or fail to
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assign responsibility for the problem, they are insufficient
notice, 25
Job site correspondence, letters, memos, and minutes of
meetings may constitute notice. Verbal notice may also
suffice is some situations. Hovi/ever , in one instance, an
extended phone conversation u/ith the Chief Engineer u/as not
considered sufficient for notice. 2 e However, the content is
generally of greater importance than the form of notice.
Requirements for Additional Detail
Many contract provisions require that the notice be
accompanied by or soon followed by submission of detailed
information regarding cost, or delay impacts. Hovi/ever
,
compliance u/ith such provisions is difficult. Courts have
often found such requirements too onerous to enforce
considering the brief time allou/ed for submission of the
not ice. 2 7 The court felt the requirement for the exact







LEGAL RULES OF APPLICATION
When a dispute arises, providing proper notice is often
considered a secondary issue. This explains the paucity of
legal cases dealing primarily with notice. Nevertheless,
the contractor must be able to show that the notice
provisions have been complied u/ith or u/aived before he can
argue other issues of entitlement. More than 30 appellate
court cases dealing primarily u/ith notice requirements o/ere
investigated to determine the current state of case lau/.




The four standard construction contract forms discussed
earlier include four distinct situations requiring notice
(sec Figure 1). These can be reduced to a tu/o-step process,
appraisal and quantitative. The first step, appraisal
notice, consists of alerting the ou/ner that the contractor:
1) is being directed to perform u/ork beyond the contract
requirements, 2) is being delayed by a situation beyond his
control, or 3 ) is encountering conditions at the
construction site that are materially different from those
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indicated in the contract documents or that were reasonably
expected. This element of notice gives the ou/ner an
opportunity to investigate the situation. The second step,
quantitative notice, affirms the contractor's intention to
request additional compensation or a time extension. This
second step alerts the ovx/ner that the contractor believes
the additional expenses are compensable under some provision
of the contract or that he is entitled to a time extension.
The ou;ner has the opportunity to reconsider his position or
to document the additional resources used by the contractor.
While this tu/o step process is evident in the contract
language, notice of events or delays is frequently
accompanied by the notice of intent. Although the elements
of notification and intent are both essential to recovery,
courts u'ill generally examine notice as a single issue.
Governing Issues
In deciding disputes involving notice, four important
questions must be answered. These are:
1. Is the requirement necessary?
2. U/as the requirement satisfied?
3. Can and has the requirement been u/aived?
4. U/as the ou/ner prejudiced?
These questions are hierarchical in nature. Depending upon
the findings of the court, the contractor may not be barred
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from recovery for failing to follou' the technical notice
requirements of the contract. A flou/ chart is provided in
Figure 2 to illustrate the determination process. Reference
cases for the various criteria are shoon in Table 5. Each
of these issues is discussed belou/.
Is the Requirement Necessary?
Normally, construction contracts require notice. If
not stated in the contract documents, then the issue is
irrelevant. However, some courts are willing to set aside
the requirements for notice if there has been a breach of
contract. Breach occurs u/hen the u/ork is materially
different from the contract scope, is a cardinal change, or
is a separate agreement outside the contract boundaries.
Nat Harrison Associates, Inc. v. Gulf States Utilities
Company serves to illustrate this concept.
The contract called for construction of approximately
158 miles of 500 KVA single-circuit, three-phase
transmission line in Louisiana. After award, a revision to
the contract was negotiated for the construction of an extra
tower arm on which an additional line was to be strung.
This extra work was applied to a portion of the transmission
line. The pertinent facts as stated by the court are as
follows
:
Gulf States was to obtain and furnish to Harrison both
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all of the basic materials necessary for the above
ground construction. The contract allowed extensions
of time for delays attributable to the "elements
(vi/eather), u/ar
, riot, strikes and other unavoidable
casualties" and for an "equitable extension of time" in
the event Gulf States failed to meet the delivery
schedule for materials and right of u/ay. "No
additional compensation of any nature," however, was to
be paid as a result of Gulf States' delays in
furnishing right of way and materials.
^
Gulf States was late in providing both right of way and
materials and did not extend the contract completion time as
provided for in the contract. In addition, Gulf States
either ignored or refused time extensions requested by
Harrison resulting from delays due to inclement weather,
strikes and other conditions. Counts II and III of
Harrison's court action respectively sought damages
resulting from acceleration of the contract and claimed
damages for breach of Gulf States' duties under the contract
to furnish the right of way and materials so that Harrison
could perform its work timely and in sequence. One
important issue centered on whether the costs allegedly
incurred by Harrison were "extra costs" within the meaning
of the notice provision. The court stated:
There is a point, however, at which changes in the
contract are to be considered beyond the scope of the
contract and inconsistent with the "changes" section.
Damages can be recovered without fulfillment of the
written notice requirement where the changes are
outside the scope of the contract and amount to a
breach. Since the evidence supports the jury's finding
that there was a breach of contract, we are unable to
hold, as a matter of law, that Harrison was required to
give prior notice of the additional costs it claims
here or that it is not entitled to damages for




Thus, the Louisiana court refused to enforce the notice
requirement where there u/as a contract breach. Importantly,
the court decision dealt very little u/ith other relevant
issues such as waiver, ovjmer knowledge, and prejudice. The
implication of the Harrison decision is that the question of
breach is supreme in the decision hierarchy, and that where
a breach occurs, the remaining questions need not be
addressed
.
It is worth noting that the judicial attitude towards
breach and notice is not unanimous. For instance, in the
case of Buchman Plumbing Company, Inc. v. Regents of The
University of Minnesota, the court refused to set aside the
requirement even though a breach occurred. The court stated
that, "compliance with provision in construction contract
requiring written notice... for damage by way of extra cost
was condition precedent to contractor's maintenance of
action for breach of contract. "^
Was the Requirement Satisfied?
Written notice implies a formal letter to the owner or
his authorized agent or representative clearly stating the
problem, applicable contract provisions, and that the
contractor expects to be compensated and/or have the
contract time extended. If done in a timely manner, then
the requirements have been satisfied. However, notice can
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be communicated in u/ays other than a formal letter. This is
usually referred to as constructive notice. Courts will set
aside the formalities if it determines that the intent of
the notice has been satisfied. The important issues in
making this determination are:
1. Ou/ner knowledge of the events and circumstances.
2. Ouner knowledge that the contractor expects
compensation or a time extension under some
provision of the contract.
3. Form of communication.
4. Timing of communication.
If it is found that the intent of the notice provision
was not satisfied, some courts may address the question of
whether the lack of notice actually prejudiced the owner.
Owner Knowledge
Owner knowledge can be in two forms: 1) actual
knowledge, and 2) constructive knowledge. Constructive
knowledge can be further subdivided into: a) implied, and b)
imputed knowledge. Each of these types of knowledge are
defined and illustrated with an actual case.
Actual Knowledge . Actual knowledge means knowledge
that is clear, definite, and unmistakable. The facts of a
situation have been conveyed orally or in writing so that

there is no doubt that the party u/ho requires the knowledge
is au/are. Neu/ Ulm Building Center, Inc. v. Studtmann, 225
N.U/.2d 4, demonstrates the essential elements of actual
knou/ledge. The case involves a couple u/ho negotiated for
the construction of a house. The builder refused to sign a
uTitten contract for a lump sum, but the parties orally
agreed to proceed u/ith construction based on an estimated
price. According to the court record.
The Studtmanns took the plans and material list to Neu'
Ulm Building Center, Inc., who agreed in writing to
furnish all of the material for the sum of $11,385,
plus 3-percent sales tax. That agreement contained the
following postscript: "If job runs less Owner will
receive credit, but not any extra unless owner is
notified." It is undisputed that as the work
progressed, there were extensive changes and "extras"
and that although the Building Center furnished the
Studtmanns with monthly statements of the cost of
materials, no specific notice was given to them that
these (costs) included extras.**
The Studtmanns visited the site daily and were fully aware
of the progress of the work. The monthly materials listing
from the Building Center and the daily site visits provided
them with the information necessary to verify actual
construction with the negotiated quantity and quality of
construction. The evidence showed and the court found that
they were fully aware that extras were being included as the
work progressed. At the trial, the Studtmanns acknowledged
that they knew of most of the extras and had talked with the
contractor about them at the time. Their primary objection
was over price. Because they did not object to the extras,




. Implied knowledge is gathered by
implication or necessary deduction from the circumstances,
the general language, or the conduct of the parties. While
this type of knowledge may not be complete in and of itself,
it is sufficient to gain attention and put the ovjuner on
guard and call for further investigation. Implied knowledge
is illustrated by the case of Hoel-Steffen Construction
Company v. United States. The case concerns the
construction of the Gateway Arch of the Jefferson National
Expansion Memorial in St. Louis, MO. Several contractors
were simultaneously involved with the construction.
Hoel-Steffen contracted with the Interior Department to
construct various interior features of the arch including
the duct work. Working space inside the arch was limited
which resulted in substantial interferences between
contractors. Some contractors received preferential access
to the construction site in a way that was not specified in
any of the contract documents. The court stated:
Where duct work contractor .. .brought dispute between
the prime contractor, transportation system
subcontractor and duct work contractor to the
government's attention, it was the contracting
officer's duty to take action to remedy the difficulty;
it was not necessary that duct work contractor
specifically accuse the government of "unreasonable or
unfair measures in attempting to resolve the problem,
"
it was enough. .. that the government knew or should have
known that it was called upon to act.'
The court decided that sufficient information had been
received to alert the owner that action on its part was





. Imputed knowledge is established
when a person in an organization is given actual notice of a
fact or circumstance and that person has the duty to report
it to the person affected. The case of Powers Regulator
Company, GSBCA Nos
. 4668, 4778, 4838 provides further
insight into how courts recognize imputed knowledge.
The contract provided for Powers to install emergency
control centers in three Social Security Administration
Program Centers constructed for the Public Building
Services, General Services Administration. The
specifications were highly technical and the installation
was complex. The court found that:
Notice of a specification dispute to a supervising
architect employed by the government constituted notice
to the contracting officer within the meaning of the
changes clause of the contract. The regional architect
on the project had the authority to approve or reject
the contractor's submittals. Under the circumstances,
the actual notice of the architect who had authority to
issue changes could be imputed to the contracting
officer because the architect was the technical expert
to the contracting officer and this was a highly
technical claim. The law is settled that a directive
need not come from the contracting officer personally,
and that he need not necessarily even be aware of
it . . .6
The court apparently felt that the circumstances were of
such importance that it was the duty of the supervising
architect to communicate the problem to the contracting
officer. However, had the dispute not been of a highly
technical nature, the court may have felt otherwise. But,
if the person who made a decision or knew of a contractor's
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predicament was properly acting u.'ithin his authority, the
ou/ner can be committed by his agent's actions without being
au'are of the situation personally. The court further stated
in the Powers case that
:
We thus hold that the contracting officer cannot
insulate himself from the operating level by layer of
construction managers, architects, and consultants,
then disclaim responsibility for the actions of one of
his agents because the contractor failed to give him
notice ."^
Implied and imputed knowledge will not always be found to
exist. Obviously, the outcome is very dependent on the
facts. Certainly, the courts will carefully examine the
technical nature of the problem, authority of those
involved, and the project management structure before
deciding if the knowledge requirement has been satisfied.
Additional Compensation Expected
Mere knowledge that additional expenses are being
incurred is not sufficient to make the owner liable for the
cost increases. Extra work may be due to contractor error,
and the courts have held that if the owner is unaware that
the contractor expects additional compensation for the
"extra" work, he will not be liable for the costs. Two
separate cases illustrate this important point.
In Watson Lumber Company v. Guennewig, 226 N.E.2d 270,
the Guennewigs contracted with Watson Lumber Company for the
construction of a four bedroom, two bath house. The
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Guenneu'igs provided the plans and Watson provided the bid
and specifications based upon those plans. After
substantial completion, the contractor claimed a right to
extra compensation udth respect to no less than 48 different
and varied items of labor and/or materials. In discussing
the issue of payment for extras, the court established the
follou'ing five conditions as prerequisites:
The law assigns to the contractor, seeking to recover
for "extras," the burden of proving the essential
elements. That is, he must establish by the evidence
that (a) the work was outside the scope of his contract
promises, (b) the extra items were ordered by the
owner, (c) the owner agreed to pay extra, either by his
words or conduct, (d) the extras were not furnished by
the contractor as his voluntary act, and (e) the extra
items were not rendered necessary by any fault of the
contractor .^
The first three elements deal with owner approval of
the item, and the last two establish whether the owner was
aware that the contractor expected additional compensation
for the "extras." The owner was apparently aware that some
of the items were not called for in the contract. Regarding
the issue of the Guennewigs knowing that Watson would later
request compensation, the court stated that:
The evidence is clear that many of the items claimed as
extras were not claimed as extras in advance of their
being supplied. Indeed, there is little to refute the
evidence that many of the extras were not the subject
of any claim until after the contractor requested the
balance of the contract price, and claimed the house
was complete. This makes the evidence even less
susceptible to the view that the owner knew ahead of
time that he had ordered these as extra items and less
likely that any general conversation resulted in the
contractor rightly believing extras had been ordered.
^
The owner's right to know that the contractor expects
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extra compensation is directly related to the ou/ner ' s right
to control his liabilities and to be protected against the
contractor voluntarily going ahead u'ith extra work and then
charging the ourier
.
The court stated that mere acceptance
by the ou/ner does not create a liability for the additional
cost. Specifically,
The contractor must make his position clear at the time
the oa-ner has to decide u/hether or not he shall incur
extra liability. Fairness requires that the ovwier
should have the chance to make such a decision. ^o
Watson also argued that the Guenneu/igs implied they
u-'ould pay for the extras. To this, the court applied
another important principle.
Mere acceptance of the vi'ork by the ovjwier...does not
create liability for an extra ... .More than mere
acceptance is required even in cases u/here there is no
doubt that the item is an "extra"... ^^
Another case that presents this consideration from a
different perspective is Schnip Building Company v. United
States. The contractor u/as contracted to build a hobby shop
at the navy submarine base at Groton, Connecticut. The
contract documents showed rock and provided for precision
blasting and excavation. The smooth rock face u/as to serve
as the concrete formu/ork and u/as intended to save the
expense of man-made u/ooden forms. During construction, the
contractor had to remove excessive excavation spoil caused
by overbreak from the blasting operation. He also sought
and received approval from the government representative to
alter the formu/ork requirements so he could use u/ooden
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forms. The dispute concerned subsurface conditions vjuhich
the contractor later alleged differed materially from those
represented in the contract drau.'ings and specifications.
The court found that
...(the government representatives) u/ere personally
unaware of existence of such conditions, and that their
observations at the jobsite did not alert them to such
condition. . . The plaintiff infers that the government
should have knou/n of the changed conditions as they
vx'ere obvious. Whether the government representatives
reasonably should have knoum from the circumstances
that subsurface conditions differing from those
described in the contract documents u/ere being
encountered u/as a question of fact. The (contractor's)
extensive backfill and grade fill requirements could
have been caused either by a subsurface condition or by
improper blasting technique. The Board considered the
evidence and said that it o/as "unable to charge the
Government vi/ith constructive knou/ledge under these
circumstances." The burden was on the appellant to
prove to the government u/hen such extensive fill needs
existed. The government had no obligations to ferret
out the reason. 1
2
The Schnip case is particularly instructive because it
establishes that ou/ner knowledge alone is insufficient to
satisfy the notice requirement. The ou/ner representative
u/as present daily and u/as fully au/are that additional costs
were being incurred. However, a reasonable person could
have inferred that the extra excavation and formwork costs
were caused by an inexperienced blasting subcontractor or
other contractor caused problems rather than from differing
site conditions. The court clearly assigned to the
contractor the duty to ensure that the government was aware
of the conditions and that the contractor expected
additional compensation. The contractor's failing in this
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case u/as not being specific and assigning the cause of the
additional costs to the differing site conditions.
Form of Notice
Where the ou/ner was au/are or should have been au/are of
the situation, kneu/ the contractor expected compensation
under some provision of the contract, and there exists some
form of communication that is signed, then the courts u/ill
likely find that the notice provisions vuill have been
satisfied. Normally, a formal letter is anticipated;
however, other forms may suffice. Thus, it is important to
realize the various forms of written communication.
Various courts have found that notice has been served
by
1. Letters from the contractor which required but did
not receive owner response.
2. Regularly updated CPM network schedules, required by
the contract, that properly assigned the
responsibility for delay.
3. Minutes of project meetings submitted by the
contractor for review and approval which noted
discussions about problems requiring notice.
The above discussion indicates that written and signed
notice can exist in various forms. But, what if documents
exist that are not signed? And, what if the notice was
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orally communicated? No cases were found that dealt
specifically with these issues.
Tim.inq of Notice
The timeliness of the notice is the final consideration
in determining if the intent of the notice provision has
been met. Occasionally an ou/ner can have knou/ledge that
there is a situation outside the contract for which the
contractor expects additional compensation, but that
knowledge becomes available so late so as to prejudice the
owner. The Schnip Building Company case also illustrates
this point. Notice was not effectively given until the
contractor filed his claim which was long after the work was
completed. The court stated:
The lack of a timely notice was prejudicial to the
Government because it effectively prevented any
verification of appellant's claim and also the
employment of alternate remedial procedures .^
^
In the Powers case the Board stated:
Regardless of terminology, the issue is whether the
government has been unnecessarily put at risk - either
the risk of additional liability to the contractor or
the risk of being unable to prepare and present its
defense against the contractor's claim - by the
contractor's delay in notifying the government of
pertinent facts. i"*
Clearly, the notice must be provided in time for the
ouTier to make an independent assessment of the situation,
decide what action to take, and to monitor the additional
work if desired. This right to control one's liabilities is
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the key consideration in determining timeliness. Generally,
if the contract specifies a time limit and the contractor is
several days late in filing notice, he will not be precluded
from recovery so long as the ou/ner still has the opportunity
to control his liabilities other than for minor
inconveniences .^ '^
If the above issues have been adequately addressed, the
courts u'ill find that the intent of the notice provision has
been satisfied, thus allowing the contractor to pursue the
more relevant questions of entitlement. Notice that the
above issues u/ere addressed without the need to introduce
the concept of prejudice. Indeed, if the above conditions
are met, the ou/ner will not have been prejudiced and the
question is irrelevant.
Owner Prejudice
To this point, raising prejudice as an issue only
serves to confuse the dispute resolution process. However,
what if one or more of the conditions have not been met?
Can the contractor still recover? When confronted with this
situation, some courts will further examine the facts to
determine if the owner has actually been prejudiced. It is
worth noting that not all courts will address this question.
Even though constructive notice may not have been
provided, situations can arise where the owner may not have
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been prejudiced. Here, the contractor must shou; that the
oaTier u/ould not have acted differently had notice been
properly communicated. A case illustrating this
consideration is Sante Fe , Inc., VABCA Nos . 1898 and 2167.
The contract called for the construction of a 520-bed
hospital at the Veterans Administration Medical Center in
Bay Pines, Florida. The dispute involved the proper
installation of lighting fixtures. The Board of Contract
Appeals stated:
Boards of contract appeals, in practice, u/ill not
enforce this technical clause [notice provision] absent
a shou/ing of prejudice by the Government. The
Government has the burden of proving that prejudice
resulted from its lack of aritten notice. To meet its
burden, the Gov^ernment must demonstrate affirmatively
"how the passage of time in fact obscured the elements
of proof" or "how the Contracting Officer might have
minimized or avoided possible extra expenses" .. .There
is no indication that the Government u/ould have acted
differently, u/ith respect to its rejection, regardless
of a notice of claim. That is, the lack of written
notice does not prejudice the Government .^
^
The Sante Fe case may not reflect the vi/ide spread
judicial attitude because even though the government had no
other alternative, it nevertheless u/as not afforded the
opportunity to document the actual costs to the government.
Also, the courts are not consistent upon u/hom rests the




If the intent of the notice provision has not been
satisfied and the o\jjner has been prejudiced, the only
recourse available to the contractor is to shoa' that the
requirement has been u/aived. An ou/ner by his actions or
inactions can waive his right to notice. In legal terms, it
is said that he u'ill be estopped from exercising his right
to insist on notice. The terms waiver and estoppel are
closely related. These will first be defined and their
similarities and differences explained prior to illustrating
the concepts with several cases.
Waiver is the intentional or voluntary relinquishment
of a known right or conduct that infers that the right has
been abandoned. Waiver is unilateral and results from some
act or conduct of one party against whom that party
operates, and no action by the other party is necessary to
complete the waiver. Thus, waiver can be created only by
the owner, and no action on the part of the contractor is
required.
Sweet divides the question of waiver into three
subissues :^ "^
1. Is the requirement waivable?
2. Who has the authority to waive the requirement?
3. Did the facts claimed to create waiver lead the
contractor to reasonably believe that the
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requirements have been eliminated or indicate that
the ou.'ner intended to eliminate the requirements?
Is the Requirement Waivable ? If there are statutes or
ordinances requiring u/ritten notice, then it cannot be
waived. This would most likely occur where the ovjuner is a
municipality, tou/nship, school board or some other public
entity. Statutory requirements are seldom an issue.
Authority to Waive . The contract provision requiring
written notice can only be waived by the owner or his
designated representative. In the case of Crane
Construction v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the court
determined the architect had no authority to waive the
notice requirements and precluded contractor recovery.^
^
Conditions of Waiver . To understand how waiver is
created, it is worthwhile to examine the meaning of waiver.
As defined by Black's Law Dictionary
.
A waiver is implied where one party has pursued such a
course of conduct with reference to the other party as
to evidence an intention to waive his rights or the
advantage to which he may be entitled .. .provided that
the other party concerned has been induced by such
conduct to act upon the belief that there has been a
waiver, and has incurred trouble or expense thereby. ^^
Normally, waiver of a right requires a consideration in
return from the other party. However, in construction
contracts as it pertains to notice requirements, a
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consideration is not required. Waiver is a voluntary,
unilateral action. Only the oumer can vx/aive the right to
notice, and no action is required from the contractor.
In construction contract disputes, u/aiver is the first
step in a tu'o-step process, the second step being that of
estoppel. U/aiver leads to estoppel vi/hen a party relies upon
the u/aiver and acts upon it. For example, an ou/ner
voluntarily waiving a right can be estopped from reasserting
that u/aived right. Thus, the two step process of the owner
waiving a right and the contractor acting upon it prevents
the ou-Tier from reasserting that right.
The principles of waiver and estoppel are illustrated
in the case of E. C. Ernst, Inc. v. Koppers Co., Inc. 20
Koppers was the turnkey prime contractor. Ernst was the
electrical subcontractor.
Koppers was responsible for the design and construction
of an A-5 coke oven battery and related facilities at
Aliquippa, PA. The oven was to be used to produce coke as
part of the steel making process. Koppers was nearing
completion of a similar facility in the Midwest and was
using that design as a basis for the Aliquippa project.
The technology was state-of-the-art. Throughout
construction, Koppers was altering the design to incorporate
lessons learned from the Midwest facility which was
experiencing numerous start-up problems. All drawing
revisions delivered to Ernst by Koppers were marked
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"Approved for Construction." Due to the design changes
coupled u/ith requests from the ou/ner and engineering
difficulties on Koppers
' part, Ernst's actual manhours u/ere
more than double the original estimate.
A provision of the electrical subcontract required that
any requests for additional compensation be submitted to
Koppers u/ithin 30 days after receiving revised drawings.
Due to the volume and magnitude of the changes received from
Koppers, Ernst u/as unable to realistically comply u/ith the
30-day requirement. Ernst u/rote Koppers and asked Koppers
to u;aive the 30-day requirement. Koppers did not respond to
Ernst's letter. Ernst u/rote again stating that since there
had been no response to the earlier letter, Ernst assumed
that Koppers was waiving the 30-day requirement. Again,
Koppers did not respond, despite the letter being circulated
internally among several departments. The court stated:
We find that the conduct of Koppers in failing to
insist on the 30 day notice provision in light of their
"approved for construction" orders to precede and their
failure to reply to Shannon's [Ernst's superintendent]
letters, prevents Koppers from now using this clause as
bar to Ernst's actions. 21
By first failing to respond, Koppers waived its right
to insist on notice. Further, by Ernst's continued
performance under the contract in reliance on Koppers'
silence, Ernst gave up its ability to comply with the 30 day
limit on a major portion of its work. Koppers knew that the
"extras" were not being priced or given written
authorization as required by the contract, yet they
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uillingly accepted Ernst's performance. Koppers u/as thus
prevented (estopped) from using the notice clause as a
defense to avoid payment to Ernst for delay damages and
compensation for extra work.
There are other ways an ovjwier can waive the notice
requirements. If the owner pays for extra work where the
notice was not provided, it will be precluded from insisting
on notice for extra work performed thereafter.
Summary of Notice Requirements
Relative to notice requirements, there is substantial
consistency among the court decisions investigated. In
evaluating if the intent of the notice provision has been
satisfied, courts rely much more on the content of the
notice than the form in which it was provided. If the owner
or his agent is aware of the situation, knows that the
contractor expects extra compensation, and the notice is
communicated in a timely manner, the intent of the notice
provision will be satisfied. If not satisfied, some courts
will further seek to determine if the owner has been
prejudiced. The only other alternative to the contractor is
to show that the condition was waived by the owner. While
Figure 2 shows waiver as the last criterion in the flowchart
hierarchy, most courts appear to consider this question
almost immediately, second only to the applicability of
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notice requirements. Cases are often determined on the
issue of waiver, and courts appear willing to evaluate the
easiest considerations first. While waiver is apparently
easier for courts to determine, it is more difficult for a
contractor to establish. A contractor establishes a firmer
dispute foundation by demonstrating compliance u/ith the
intent of the notice provision.
Caution admonishes that there is no uniformity among
the host of construction contracts the contractor will
encounter either in the number of days of notice required or
in the number of days in which the other party is required
to respond to the contractor notice. Therefore, two steps
should be taken. First, study each construction contract
anew to ascertain the specific notice requirements.
Secondly, be cautious of supplemental provisions that may







PURPOSE AND RELEVANT ISSUES
Purpose of Written Change Orders
After formation of a construction contract, unexpected
situations typically arise. As stated by Su/eet
,
"The contract documents are at best an imperfect
expression of u/hat the design professional and ou/ner
intend to be performed by the contractor .. .After au/ard
of a construction contract, the owner may find it
necessary to order changes in the u/ork.''^
To attain the goal of a complete and usable facility,
flexibility must be incorporated into the contract to allou/
the ou/ner to react to those unanticipated situations.
Construction contracts almost alu/ays include provisions
allou'ing the ou/ner to order changes in the u/ork without
invalidating the contract. The mechanism used to formalize
changes is the change order. Procedures define hou/ changes
are made. These procedures u/ritten in the contract
documents, serve to protect both the oumer and contractor.
For instance, change orders are required to be in u/riting.
Other provisions may also be included to govern how the
contractor is to respond if he feels he is being ordered to
perform extra u/ork. The purpose of these procedural
requirements is essentially the same as the requirement for
notice. 2 That is, the ouTier has the right to know the
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nature and extent of his promises and liabilities. The
requirement for written change orders protects the ou/ner
from unknowingly incurring a liability through the course of
routine interpretations of the contract documents and normal
interaction with the contractor.
Contract Language
The essential elements of the contract clauses related
to written change order requirements are:
1. Only persons with proper authority can direct
changes
2. The form of directive must be in writing
3. The directive must be signed by a person with
proper authority
4. Procedures for communicating the change are stated
5. Procedures for contractor response are defined
The relevant contract clauses for the four standard
contract forms are summarized in Tables 6 through 9. In
each, authority is granted to the architect, contracting
officer or engineer. All require that the directive be
written. Since the AIA and EJCDC documents are used in
situations where the owner is represented by an agent, both
require the directive to be signed by the owner.
Thereafter, the change is issued to the contractor through




Comparison of American Institute of Architects
Standard Specification (c) 1976
Requirements Involving Change Orders
(AIA)
! Situation Change !
1 & Document ! Order 1 Contract
! Reference ' Element ! Requirement
IDiffering Site Authorization 1 Ou/ner
IConditions ! Form ! Change order
:A201, Signed by I Ou/ner and Architect
!Para. 12.2.1 Communication 1
Procedures !
Written
Contractor 1 Contractor signature
Response ! indicates agreeement
: Extra Work Authorization 1 Owner
IA201, Form ! Change order
IPara. 12.3.1 Signed by I Ou/ner and Architect
Communication! Written
Procedures !
Contractor I Contractor signature
Response 1 indicates agreeement
{Variation in Authorization! Oumer
1 Estimated Form ! Change order
{Quantities Signed by ! Ou/ner and Architect
!A201, Communication! Written
:Para. 12.1.5 Procedures !
Contractor 1 Contractor signature




! Changes Form ! Order




Contractor 1 Carry out promptly
Response 1
[Changes ! Authorization! Ou/ner
1A201, Form ! Change order
IPara. 12.1.2 ! Signed by ! OuTier and Architect
Communication Written
Procedures !
Contractor I Contractor signature




Comparison of Federal Acquisition Regulations
Standard Specifications (1985)
Requirements Involving Change Orders
FAR)
Situation
& Document Notice 1 Contract 1




Condi tions Form 1 Contract Modification !
FAR 52.236-2 Signed by 1 Contracting Officer !
Communication 1 Written 1
Procedures !
Contractor ! Contractor signature !
Response 1 indicates agreeement !
Extra Work Authorization 1 Contracting Officer !
FAR 52.24 3-4 Form 1 Order !
Signed by 1 Contracting Officer !
Communication! Oral or Written !
Procedures !
Contractor ! Provide written notice !
Response I
Variation in Authorization 1 Contracting Officer !
Estimated Form ! Contract Modification !




Contractor I Contractor signature !
Response ! indicates agreeement !
Minor Authorization! Not separately !
Changes Form ! identified. Included !





Changes Authorization! Contracting Officer !
FAR 52.243-4 Form ! Contract Modification 1
Signed by ! Contracting Officer !
Communication! Written 1
Procedures !
'Contractor ! Contractor signature 1




Comparison of Engineers Joint Contract Document Committee
(EJCDC) Standard Specification (1983)
Requirements Inv'olving Notice
Situation 1
& Document Notice Contract !
Reference Element Requirement 1
Differing Site Authorization Engineer !
Conditions Form Change contract documents I
Para. 4.3.2 Signed by Engineer 1
Communication Written 1
Procedures
Contractor Not specified !
Response
Extra Work Authorization Engineer 1
Para. 11.2 Form Change order !
Signed by Ou/ner I
Communication Written I
Procedures
Contractor Contractor signature 1
Response indicates agreeement I
Variation in Authorization Engineer 1
Estimated Form Change Order 1




Contractor Contractor signature I
Response indicates agreeement !
Minor Authorization Engineer !
Changes Form Field order 1
Para. 9.5 Signed by Engineer I
Communication Written !
Procedures
Contractor Contractor signature 1
Response indicates agreeement 1
Changes Authorization Engineer 1
Para. 11.2 Form ! Change Order 1
Signed by ' Ovuner 1
Communication 1 Written !
Procedures
•Contractor 1 Contractor signature !




Comparison of Pennsylvania Department of Transportation
(PennDOT) Standard Specification (1983)
Requirements Involving Notice
Situation
& Document Notice Contract 1
Reference Element Requirement !
Differing Site Authorization DSC clause is not !
Conditions Form included in the standard 1





Extra Work Authorization District Engineer !
Para. 104.03 Form Work order !
& 110.03 Signed by District Engineer 1
Communication Written !
Procedures
Contractor Contractor signature !
Response indicates agreeement !
Variation in Authorization District Engineer 1
Estimated Form Work order 1
Quantities Signed by District Engineer 1




Minor Authorization Engineer I
Changes Form Work order !






Changes Authorization District Engineer I
Para. 110.03 Form Work order !




Response indicates agreeement !
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the architect or engineer can unilaterally order changes.
The FAR and PennDOT documents specifically state that the
inspector has no authority to order changes. Procedures for
contractor response u/ere discussed in Chapter 2. Thus, each
document clearly addresses the elements of change listed
above. There is little difference betu/een the content of
the four documents.
Definition and Classification of Change Orders
The study of change orders is most convenient u/hen
viewed in tu/o parts, the change and the order. A change is
a requirement beyond the boundaries of the contract
documents. An order is a directive from the ou/ner to the
contractor to perform the change. Pertinent issues related
to the order (directive) are the main focus of Chapters 4
and 5. Hou/ever , it is vi'orthu/hile to briefly cover the
essential characteristics of the change itself.
The change relates to the element that deviates from
the contract documents. Changes can arise from many sources
and various situations are covered by different parts of the
contract documents. A diagram outlining the hierarchy of
changes is shou/n is Figure 3. Reasons for changes and
circumstances surrounding them are diverse, and importantly,
the common law and rules governing entitlement depend upon























As shouL'n in Figure 3, changes can be classified as
bilateral or unilateral modifications. Bilateral changes
are beyond the contract scope and must be agreed to by both
parties. Bilateral changes do not fall u/ithin the changes
clause, and the contractor is not obligated to perform the
u-'ork. A discussion of bilateral changes is beyond the scope
of this paper.
Unilateral changes can be both vuithin and beyond the
general contract scope. Changes that are beyond the scope
of the contract are called cardinal changes. Rubin
clarifies cardinal changes:
One ruling states that a "cardinal change has been
found to exist u/hen the essential identity of the thing
contracted for is altered or u/hen the method or manner
of anticipated performance is so drastically and
unforeseeably changed that essentially a neu; agreement
is created. "^
It follou/s that if the project is altered by cardinal
changes to the point that it is no longer the same as bid
upon by the contractor, then the contractor is not obligated
to perform. Hou/ever , cardinal changes can arise in many
u'ays , and often cannot be recognized until after the fact.
Therefore, making generalities relative to how they vi/ill be
evaluated by a court is indeed risky.
A unilateral directive by the ou/ner that makes changes
u/ithin the general contract scope is the most common type of
construction change. The changes clause in the contract is
applicable. Changes can be actively or passively (tacitly)
directed by the ou/ner. Active direction is communicated
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either orally or in u/riting, u/hile passive direction
(constructive change) is communicated by conduct or by
inaction u/hen some action is required. The line separating
active and passive communication is often obscure and is
sometimes confused in the literature.
Most disputes arise vjuhere the contractor believes he
has been directed to perform work outside of the contract
scope, but the ou/ner refuses to acknowledge the change,
VUhen the change involves oral directives, the principle
questions are:
1. U/as the ou/ner properly notified?
2. Is the contractor entitled to additional
compensation through some provision of the contract?
3. Was a constructive change ordered by a valid oral
change order?
The notice question u/as addressed in Chapters 2 and 3.
Questions involving entitlement are a function of the type
of change and the contract language. Applicable rules
differ depending on u/hether there is extra u/ork, a differing
site condition, defective specifications, errors and
omissions, large changes in quantities, and so forth. If
the u/ork in question is u/ithin the contract scope, then
there is generally no entitlement unless, for example, the
contractor u/as directed to alter his methods. Questions
involving oral directives can arise when the u/ork is u/ithin
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or bevoncl the contract boundaries, and it must be determined
if the u'ork u/as directed or done voluntarily.
Issues Related to Oral Change Orders
Changes are common, yet disagreements often arise for a
v^ariety of reasons. In dealing ulth changes, Simon suggests
that the following questions are relevant:
1. What does the contract state?
2. Does the changes clause apply in this instance?
3. Assuming that it does apply, have you complied with
it?
4. Assuming it does apply and you have not complied,
u'hat are the exceptions to the enforcement of the
clause?
5. Have you complied u/ith an exception?
6. Assuming that you have not complied with an
exception, do you have an equitable basis on which
to argue for the establishment of still another
exception?''
The first question has already been considered by examining
the four standard contract documents. The remaining
questions will be briefly discussed below.

60
Does the Changes Clause Apply?
If the change is found to be beyond the general
contract scope (a bilateral or cardinal change), the
literature suggest that the formal contract requirements
controlling hou.' the change is to be issued may not apply.
Otheru/ise, the changes clause is usually applicable.
Has There Been Compliance With the Changes Clause?
Despite variations in contract language, two criteria
seem to decide if the changes clause has been satisfied.
These are proper authority and satisfying the intent.
Proper Authority . It is essential that the person
directing the change has the authority to do so. Stokes
states :
An ou/ner of a construction project needs to make
certain that the contract documents specify u/ho has
authority to order changes in the work. An ou/ner must
retain control over changes to the contract. The ou;ner
does not u/ant to be liable for changes that were
ordered by someone who had no authority to do so.°
Change authority is normally specified in the contract
documents as the owner or his designated representative.
The four standard contract forms each include specific
references about authority. However, authority may also be
apparent or implied from the responsibilities or conduct of
an individual or party. If the situation leads a contractor
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to reasonably infer that a certain individual has authority
to direct changes, then authority may be imputed him.
Intent of Changes Clause Satisfied . Changes are
usually directed by issuing a signed, u/ritten change order.
Relative to the directive, Simon states, "Many contracts
provide that there be a "signed," "written," "order. "^ He
further states:
Since most contracts do not specify the format for the
u-'riting, various documents might, in the judge's
discretion, constitute the u/riting so as to fulfill tl-ie
"written" portion of the clause requirement. That
u/riting might be found in letters, transmittal notices,
revised plans and specifications, notations on shop
drawings, job minutes, field records, daily reports,
signed time and material slips, internal memoranda, or
other documents .. .The next consideration is to
determine whether the words written order require a
"written order" or a "written" "order." If they are
read together as a single phrase (which they are not),
the owner's furnishing a sketch, revised drawing, or a
new plan, along with the oral directive to perform the
work "or else," would not fulfill the technical
requirements. However, if the words are interpreted to
mean that both a writing and an order must exist, the
sketch and oral directive would suffice."'
The literature suggests that the above consideration
determines if the owner's rights have been protected. The
tendency of the courts is to require a writing and an order.
Thus, an oral direction must be supplemented by other
conditions to show that the owner directed, had knowledge





Exceptions to the Clause
The exception most often mentioned in the literature is
that of vjL/aiver. That is, the owner has waived his right to
insist that the change be reduced to u/riting. In this
regard, the issue of change differs from that of notice.
Notice is viewed as a contractual technicality or procedure.
Hou-ever, a change is an alteration to the basic contract
involving considerations (exchange of value). Therefore,
courts may proceed more cautiously when dealing with waiver
of rights relative to changes.
A relevant question is can the right or condition be
waived? This question is most important when the owner is a
public agency because the owner representative may be acting
within his or her contract-specified roles but may be
directing changes that are beyond the authority granted by
regulations and statutes. An example is provided by Simon:
Determination of the authority is not as easy as it may
appear on the surface. In Blum v. City of Hillsboro,
supra, the Mayor, City Council and Architect all
approved the change. They are proper parties and have
apparent and actual authority; however, external
limitations (the bidding statutes) placed a different
form of prohibition on that authority. This might be
called an artificial limitation on authority, but to
those involved in the construction process, when they
are unable to be paid for what otherwise appears to be
a properly authorized, issued and executed change
order, that is not an artificial barrier. It is very
real .^
Relative to the authority issue, statutes will always
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prevail over the contract language. The prudent contractor
should be fully aware of the local statutes and regulations.
Complianc e u'ith Requirements of the Exception
It is usually more difficult for the contractor to
prove an exception than to shou/ compliance. In asserting an
exception, the contractor must prove both the existence of
the exception and compliance UL'ith the requirements of the
exception. The following conditions are pertinent:
1. Direction is clear and/or of a satisfactory
character
.
2. Ou-ner approves the u/ork being performed.
3. Ou-'ner authorizes or allows the work to proceed.
4. Distinct agreement between parties that the work is
not required by the original contact.
5. Definite agreement to pay for the change.^- i°
If a contractor is unable to justify performance based
upon the oral direction by any of the above conditions, he
has little recourse other than to seek recovery on the
theory of equity. Simon states:
The entire argument and presentation of exception is
guided by principles of equity and the effectiveness of
a non-written modification in spite of a contract
condition that modifications must be written depends
upon whether enforcement of the condition is or is not
barred by equitable consideration, not upon
technicality of whether the condition was or was not
expressly and separately waived before the non-written
modification. [Universal Builders, Inc. v. Moon Motor





the topic of equity receives little discussion in
the literature, and a lengthy revievi' of court cases
indicates that most courts seldom render decisions in favor
of the contractor based on equity.
Cl auses Specifically Precluding Oral Direction
Some contracts specifically prohibit oral directives in
an attempt to prevent the owner's waiver of the written
change, order requirements. However by attempting to limit
the owner's exposure to disputes involving oral change
orders, the owner's fle.xibility to make changes in immediate
situations is also reduced. Sweet states that many attempts
to contractually prevent subsequent changes are ineffective.
He further indicates that rather than seeking to bar waiver
of the written change order requirement, a more effective
approach is to allow reinstatement of the requirement
following a designated grace period. 12
Contract Formation Principles
Issues related to oral change orders are viewed
differently from notice requirements because change orders
are alterations to the basic contract agreement.
Conversely, notice is a technicality of contract execution.
To fully understand how the courts view change orders, it is
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necessary to revieu' the basic principles of contract






2. Proper subject matter





Additionally, contracts for certain types of transactions
m.ay need to be in viriting. Three of the most relevant
elements are discussed belovi/.
Offer and Acceptance
There must be an offer and an acceptance for a valid
contract to exist. The acceptance must be clear, absolute
and unqualified. A qualified acceptance or a counteroffer
is a new proposal.
Consid erations
Valid contracts require considerations or an exchange
of something of value, u/hat Svjueet refers to as the
preexisting duty rule. Courts have difficulty in validating
change orders where there has been no such exchange,
however, there are several exceptions. Sweet states:
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This preexisting rule is criticized. It limits the
autonomy of the parties by denying enforceability of
agreements voluntarily made. Implicit in the rule is
an assumption that an increased price for the same
amount of u'ork is likely to be the result of expressed
or implied coercion on the part of the contractor, as
if the contractor is saying "pay me more money or I
vjL'ill quit and you U/lll have to u'histle for the
damages." Hou'ever , suppose the parties have arrived at
a modification of this type voluntarily. There is no
reason for not giving effect to their agreement. ^^
Form
Statutes sometimes preclude oral changes. This is
particularly true for public agencies and local governments
and authorities. Where there are no governing statutes or
regulations, oral contracts can be created. Yet, most
contracts contain explicit provisions stating that changes
must be u.'ritten. While most do not expressly preclude oral
change orders, that is clearly the intent. In appraising
the importance of limiting the form of change orders to
viritten directives, the Supreme Court of Iowa in quoting
from the Corpus Juris Secundum stated:
Such a provision (requiring it to be in u-'riting),
hou'ever, is not of the essence of the contract, but is
a detail in the performance .. .^ ''
This vieu' is consistent u'ith legal principles in that oral
contracts are valid so long as the other elements of
contract formation are present.
Quoting from the sixth volume of Ruling Case Lavu, pp.
914 and 915, the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that
oral changes are valid:
Moreover, though the parties to a contract may
stipulate that it is not to be varied except by an

67
agreement in vi'riting, they may, by a subsequent
contract not in uriting, modify it by mutual consent.
One u'ho hias agreed that he ulll only contract by
viTiting in a certain way does not thereby preclude
himself from, making a parole (sic) bargain to change
it. There can be no more force in an agreement in
u'riting not to agree by parole (sic) than in a parole
(sic) agreement not to agree in writing, and every
agreement of that kind is ended by the new one, u/hich
contradicts it . ^ =
Thus, the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals court went beyond the
Supreme Court of Iowa court by stating that oral
modifications are still valid even though there may be
language prohibiting oral changes.
Further quoting from the case of Illinois Cent. R. Co.
V. Manion, 113 Ky . 7, S.U'. 40, 101 Am. St. Rep. 345, the
c(M.:rt stated:
Though the written contract has a clause forbidding
such oral alteration, and declaring that no change in
it shall be valid unless in writing, such provision
does not become a part of the law of the land; it is
like another agreement which is superseded by a new
one. So that in spite of it an oral alteration may be
validly made .^ ^
Finally, quoting from the case of Bartlett v.
Stanchfield, 148 Mass. 394, 19 N.E. 549, 2 L.R.A. 625,
the court noted:
Attempts of parties to tie up by contract their freedom
of dealing with each other are futile. The contract is
a fact to be taken into account in interpreting the
subsequent conduct of the plaintiff and defendant, no
doubt. But it cannot be assumed, as matter of lau',
that the contract governed all that was done until it
was renounced in so many words, because the parties had
a right to renounce it in any way, and by any mode of
expression they saw fit. They could substitute a new
oral contract by conduct and intimation, as well as by
express words. ^'^
Thus, the contract itself does not have the power of
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the lau' even though tu'o parties agreed to bind themselves in
accordance U'ith its provisions. Instead, the contract is
used by the lau.' to "interpret the subsequent conduct" of the
parties and correctly apply the lau'. Since common lavu
recognizes oral contracts as being valid instruments, unless
specifically precluded by statute, the contract itself




ORAL CHANGE ORDERS CRITERIA:
LEGAL RULES OF APPLICATION
0\'(=>r 30 appellate court cases u'ere revieu'ed to
determine hoa' the lavL' vieu/s ora] change orders. The results
shou' that the courts have dealt u'ith the issue in a
consistent manner. The purpose of this section is to
present the criteria used by the courts in deciding oral
change order disputes. The criteria are presented in Figure
4 uith reference cases for the various criteria shoa-n in
Table 10. Each criterion is discussed belou'.
Applicability of Changes Clause
The initia] consideration is a'hether the disputed aork
is covered by the changes clause. Directed u/ork u/hich is
outside the contract scope are categorized by many
different names, extra u'ork, additional u/ork, and
alterations. Typically, the requirement for a signed,
uritten change order applies to "extra work, " If it is
found that the nature of the u/ork u/as not "extra u'ork" but
"additional work," the requirement may be circumvented.
Obviously, the specific contract language is a deciding
factor and the individual clauses addressing these various
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this point u-as hecird before the United States Supreme
Court .
1
H. D. Wood and Company u/as a contractor hired to
constr'jct a a'ater distribution system for the city of Fort
Wayne, Indiana. Pipe diameters ranged from 4 to 24 inches.
A riv^er crossing was also included. The contract contained
the typical requirement that no claim for extra work would
be considered unless done in response to a uritten order
from the ou/ner
. The contract also allowed the owner to
alter the quantities and such increases or decreases would
be compensated. Finally, the contract specified the
engineer as responsible for determining the amount of work
and materials authorized for payment, to decide all
questions relative to the contract documents, and that his
estimate and decision were final.
Wood visited the Engineer's office and reviewed the
contract documents. The original plans showed the
under river crossing at Calhoun Street. After Wood was
avj.'arded the contract but before he began work on the
under river crossing, the city relocated the crossing to
Clinton Street. The relocation resulted in a increase from
tu'o to seven feet of water depth and from a solid bottom to
a bottom described as quicksand. The city directed the
engineer to accomplish the change but refused to issue any
written direction or change order to the contractor. The
city promised the extra work would be taken care of at a
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later date but subsequently refused the contractor's claim.
The contract documents specified that the ouner could
direct extra u'ork or make alterations in the extent,
dimensions, form or plan of the work. The documents further
stated that only claims for extra u/ork done in obedience to
a written order of the engineer and trustees would be
entertained. No such restriction was placed on alterations
to the work.
The court evaluated the contract provisions for extra
u'ork and for alterations and determined that the nature of
the work was within the alteration clause and not under the
changes clause. The contractor was allowed to recover.
The city's intent was probably to have all changes,
including extra work and alterations, be authorized only by
uritten direction. However, a loophole existed in the
contract that allowed the contractor to recover. Most
contracts contain general clauses that effectively close
this possibility.
Statutory Requirement for Written Directive
Where statutes and regulations require written
directives, the requirement will not be set aside. This was
affirmed by the District Court of Alaska which quoted the
Corpus Juris Secundum and stated:
A written contract may, in the absence of statutory
provisions requiring a writing, be modified by a
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subsequent oral agreement. 17 C.J.S., Contracts,
section 377, page 865, note 36.
^
This criterion must be carefully weighed u'hen
performing u/ork for public agencies, municipalities and
authorities. Where regulations exist, there a'ill be no
recoverv.
Va 1 i d Contract Alteration
In most instances, the changes clause will apply and
there u'ill be no statutory considerations. Thus, resolving
a dispute u'ill be reduced to determining if a valid contract
alteration has been created. The formation principles of
offer and acceptance and considerations are relevant to this
determination. For an offer and acceptance to be created,
the ou'ner must have knowledge of the circumstances. The
considerations criterion necessitates that the owner be
au.'are that the contractor is expecting compensation.
Considerations can also be extended by an implied or express
prom.ise to pay. These issues are discussed below.
Ou'ner Knowl edge
Of primary importance is whether the contractor was
orally directed to do the work or was acting as a volunteer.
The case of Watson Lumber Company v. Guennewig illustrates
this issue. Quoting from the Corpus Juris Secundum, the

Appellate Court of Illinois stated:
...as a general rule, a builder or contractor is not
entitled to additional compensation for extra u/ork or
materials voluntarily furnished by him adthout the
ou'ner
'
s request or knou'ledge that he (contractor)
expects to be paid therefor.
^
In the U'atson case, some of the extra items u/ere orally
agreed to beforehand, some were ratified after the fact, and
others were not claimed by the contractor as extras until
the dispute arose. The court disallowed those items that
u'ere provided by the contractor u'ithout the oaoner ' s
knou'ledge or consent without considering any other points of
lau
.
Thus, owner knou'ledge is an important prerequisite to
recov'ery
.
The Iowa Court of Appeals decided a similar dispute
stating that, "Waiver of written change order requirement
does not entitle subcontractor to perform extra work without
any approval whatsoever."" In this case, Nelson-Roth was
the owner, UDE was the prime contractor, and Central Iowa
Grading (CIO) was an earthwork subcontractor. GIG was
orally ordered by UDE to perform numerous changes. The
requested work was done, but CIG performed additional work
that had not been requested. The claim for this extra work
was rejected by both Nelson-Roth and UDE. Even though the
owner and prime contractor had disregarded the contract
provisions requiring written changes, the court determined





The issue of an oral directive u'as involved in a case
heard before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. The case of
Supreme Construction Co. v. Olympic Recreation, Inc.
in\'olved construction of a bowling alley in which the prime
contractor abandoned the project. A subcontractor,
Christfulli Company, installed the electrical wiring,
lighting, and equipment in the building. The subcontractor
sought compensation from the owner for extras performed at
the oral direction of the prime. The changes in electrical
work w<^re not readily apparent, and it was unlikely that
Olympic would have been aware that they were being done.
The testimonies presented were inconsistent, and the court
was unable to establish a sound basis for compensation for
the extras. The court placed the burden of proof on the
subcontractor claiming the extra, and he was unable to prove
that Olympic Recreation knew of the work. Therefore, he was
not entitled to recovery.
Addi t ional Compensation Expected or P romised
An owner through the course of administering a
construction contract, may be aware of various conditions
involving additional costs, yet he may not be aware that the
contractor expects additional compensation. Courts have
determined that mere knowledge of additional work is
insufficient to assure recovery of extra costs. The next
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consideration for a valid oral contract is vjL'hether the earner
knf>i' the contractor u-as expecting additional compensation or-
the ou.'ner impliedly or expressly agreed to pay for the
additional cost of the extra U/ork. The contractor will be
precluded from recovering additional costs if the oa-ner did
not kuoKi the contractor expected additional compensation. A
case heard before the Federal E^istrict Court in Alabama
illustrates this essential criterion.
The government contracted u'ith Mr. Algernon Blair to
dismantle certain prefabricated buildings located at
Granada, Mississippi and transport them to Key West,
Florida. There, the buildings a'ere to be reassembled by the
contractor. During the reassembly phase, a hurricane struck
Key U'est and caused considerable damage to some of the
buildings. The ou/ner telephoned the contractor's
representative and directed him to protect the u;ork and
repair the damage. In ordering the u;ork no agreement was
made to pay for the additional cost but the question of
liability for that cost was deferred until later. Ten days
following the oral direction, the government sent a letter
to Blair stating in part,
In view of the foregoing, you are advised that; the
Contractor will be expected to complete the project in
accordance with the terms of the Contract, without any
additional cost to the Gov^ernment as a result of damage
caused by the hurricane.
Upon completing the work, the plaintiff requested additional
compensation based on the oral direction. However, the
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aovprnm^nt had never agreed to pay for the additional u'ork
and had no reason to believe the contractor expected
additional monies for the repairs. In deciding for the
government, the court stated:
Where contract provides that there shall be no charge
for extra work unless a uritten agreement is made
therefor, the builder cannot recover compensation as
for extra work on account of alterations made at the
oral request or consent of the owner but for which no
written agreement to pay additional compensation is
made .^
In the case of Berg v. Kucharo Construction Company,
the issue was that of a promise to pay. The project
inV'Olved construction of over two hundred and fifty
apartment buildings and houses for the Federal Housing
Administration. Berg, the plaintiff subcontractor, had a
contract u*ith Kucharo Construction Co., the prime
contractor, that stated that no oral agreement would be
honored and only extras directed in writing and agreed to
before construction would be recognized for additional
compensation.
Numerous defects in material and other items affecting
the work of Berg were brought to the attention of Kucharo
u'ho repeatedly instructed Berg to get it done and that he
would be paid. However, Kucharo later refused to pay,
citing the requirement for written directives. Quoting from
9 Am. Jur. 17, the court stated:
The courts have adopted various theories of avoidance
which may be classed as those of independent contract,
modification or rescission, waiver, and
estoppel .. .Among the acts or conduct amounting to
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\x-p.iver are the oU'Tier
' s knouledge of, agreement to, or
acquiescence in such extra work, a course of clealins
u'hich repeatedly disregards such stipulation, and a
promise to pay for extra work orally requested by the
ou'ner and performed in reliance thereon.''
The court concluded that the VLritten contract was
properly modified by an oral agreement, and the essential
elements of a binding contract existed. Kucharo's offer to
pay could not be rescinded once Berg accepted that offer by
performing the work.
Another case involving a promise to pay was heard by
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma. The case involved the
construction of a residence. The homeowner orally requested
changes to the contract , and the changes were performed by
the contractor. At the time, the owner acknowledged that
there u'ere additional cost involved. The contractor
finished the house, and the work was accepted by the ouner
.
Houev^er, the owner refused to pay for the extra work
contending that directives were not in writing. The court
determined that an oral contract had been made because the
promise to pay was an acceptance on the contractor's offer
to perform the work for additional considerations.^
Qrs\^L^ ^l Authorized Agent
If the contractor receives an oral directive to perform
changes to the work, it needs to be issued by a person





F^O'j.r Mills of America. Inc. v. American Steel
Building Co., the Supreme Court of Oklahoma considered
claims and counterclaims of the three parties involved. The
contract was for the construction of a building addition to
the grain storage facilities in Alva, Oklahoma ou/ned by
Flour Mills. Problems arose during construction including
moisture damage to grain that was already stored.
Additional work was also directed. The contractor claimed
compensation for extras orally directed by the owner. The
court specifically determined that those who ordered the
extra work had been authorized to do so by Flour Mills. The
court also stated:
The same principle ... is recognized by this court in
Jackson Materials Co. v. Grand River Dam Authority,
supra, at page 560 of the Pacific report of the
opinion, but was not applied therein because the person
who made the subsequent oral agreements involved
therein had not been authorized to do so and his action
in doing so had not been ratified by the only entity
authorized by statue to make such agreements.^
Authority can be either actual or apparent. However,
tlie above case affirm*^ the important condition that apparent
authority cannot be extended to someone who does not posses
authority unless there is some positive action (or inaction)
by the person who actually possesses the authority. i° A
case heard before the Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth
Circuit, further illustrates apparent authority. The
contract called for hauling a steamer ferry out of the water
for overhaul. The overhaul included significant timber
replacement, remetaling, recaulking and plumbing and
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straightening. The contract contained a provision stating
that no extra u/ork of any kind U'ould be considered unless it
u'as submitted beforehand and was approved and signed by the
chairman of the board of the ferry company. When the u'ork
began, the condition of the ferry vi'as found to be much U-'orse
than anticipated. At a conference with the contractor, the
master of the steamer (Capt. Cherry), the president of the
ferry company, and the inspector, additional repairs u/ere
agreed upon orally. These were subsequently performed by
the contractor.
The court found that there was confusion concerning
u'h?.t was said and what was intended by the various parties
at the conference. However, at the conclusion of the
conference, the plaintiff was told to "go ahead." The court
stated
:
Work vi'as immediately begun on the hull, under the
direction of Capt. Cherry as superintendent, who
stayed at the work, and directed personally what rotten
wood and timbers should be taken out and what work
should be done, and how it should be done, until the
steamer was completed. . .1 ^
The court also noted that the president and various
officers of the ferry company were frequently at the steamer
and allowed the work to be done. Although not provided for
by the contract, Capt. Cherry possessed apparent authority
to direct the extra work, and the officers of the company
made no attempts to limit his directing the work. This
inaction by the ferry company was sufficient to lead the
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cortractor to believe that the ferry captain had the
authority to direct the changes.
Considerations
Valid contracts require considerations or an exchange
of something of value. This criterion can include a
determination of u.'hether the oral directive was a unilateral
promise or a bilateral agreement. Hou/ever , courts may not
be consistent regarding this issue. Su/eet designates this
rccii;irement for consideration as the preexisting duty rule.
As expressed in Chapter 4, Su-'eet believes parties should not
be restricted from making agreements lacking considerations
if the agreements are made voluntarily. Consider the
follou'ing case.
The Supreme Court of California heard a dispute between
an a owner constructing a building and the contractor who
was hired to perform the concrete work for the foundation
walls and retaining walls. The initial written agreement
specified a unit price based on actual measurements of
formwork . Prior to construction, the parties met and orally
agreed to modify the method of measurement to include all
concrete actually placed whether within or outside the forms
and to the adjust this quantity by an appropriate factor to
account for waste and shrinkage. For payment purposes, the
contractor provided daily concrete delivery tickets to the
owner. Later, the owner refused to pay in accordance with
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the modi f: eel terms alleging the agreement was invalid. He
stated the change u'as not in u'riting as required and the
change resulted in additional compensation for the
contractor but lacked consideration to the ovjuner
.
The majority opinion agreed u.'ith the contractor and
avL'arded recovery, Hovi/ever , there were strongly dissenting
opinions that argued that the potential for fraud was
increased if the court allowed a claim where there was no
consideration. The minority opinion is clearly consistent
with the well established principles of contract formation.
Waiver of Written Requirement
Waiver is created by words, actions or inactions of the
ou'ner which result in the disregard of a contract
re-rtuiremcnt . If the contractor relies on the owner's
conduct and acts in a way which is to his detriment, the
owner will then be estopped from using the requirement
against the contractor. The following case provides an
excellent example of the waiver of the written changes
requirement
.
The case of Reif v. Smith, heard before the Supreme
Court of South Dakota, involved construction work on a log
home. Partly due to inadequacy of the plans, there were
numerous changes during the construction. Section 15 of the
contract documents specified that all changes must be
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crciered in uriting anci any change in contract price must be
s-pttled prior to commencement of the u-ork . Relative to
Section 15, the court stated:
Generally, provisions like Section 15 prevent
contractors from recovering for alterations or extras
not subject to a a'ritten order... Such provision,
hou'ever , are impliedly vi'aived by the ouTier where he has
kno'X'ledge of the change, fails to object to the change,
and u'here other circumstances exist which negate the
provision; i.e., the builder expects additional
payment, the alteration was an unforeseen necessity or
obvious, subsequent oral agreement, or it was ordered
or authorized by the owner .. .Additionally , repeated or
entire disregard for contract provisions will operate
as a waiver of Section 15.^2
The trial court record indicated that the Smiths
(ou'i'ier) were on the job site repeatedly, had knowledge of
certain changes and authorized others, and made several
progress payments after the changes were made. The court
fc>und the Smiths' actions inconsistent and said that:
Ou'ner who drew construction contract with written
change order requirement could not come into court and
acknowledge having authorized some changes without
single written change order and admit liability for
such items but deny waiver as to other changes as to
vi'hich he had knowledge but made no objection. ^^
The Smith's conduct was apparently consistent and
resulted in several oral changes. Since the conditions of
change order creation were identical, the Smith's could not
acknou'ledge some and disavow others. The court determined
that the Smiths by their conduct had waived the requirement






VALIDATION OF RULES OF APPLICATION
Purpose of Verification
The rules developed in the preceding chapters U'ere
distilled from many decades of United States Federal and
State Appellate Court case law and Board of Contract Appeal
decisions. Though the rules u.'ere developed from criteria
appearing in all three legal jurisdictions, no apparent
difference were ei'ident between the courts. Cases involving
only notice as the primary dispute are infrequent. To
obtain an adequate sampling, some older cases were reviewed;
the oldest case included in this research involved repair
work made necessary by the Civ^il War. This body of case law
is continually responding to changes in legislative law and
judicial attitudes. The reference cases used in developing
the rules (see Tables 5 and 10) were evaluated to determine
their subsequent treatment by later decisions. Also, the
rules thems'^lves were evaluated against the most recent
court decisions involving disputes over notice and oral
change order requirements to determine if they
satisfactorily represent the criteria currently used by the




Verification was a three step process. First the
reference cases used in developing the rules were
"Shepardised" to evaluate how the decisions were
subsequently treated in other disputes. From this research,
no modifications of the decisions were made on the issues of
notice or oral changes.
Secondly, the research, rules and flowchart logic were
evaluated by Mr. C. Grainger Bowman, an attorney for the
lau; firm of McNees, Wallace and .Nurick, Harrisburg PA. He
is a member of the American Bar Association and the
Pennsylvania Bar Association in which he serves as chairman
of the public contract law committee. Specializing in
construction contract disputes and public contract law, his
critical revieu' provides needed evaluation by someone
trained specifically in contract law matters. His response
was enthusiastic and his few supplemental comments have been
incorporated into the paper.
Lastly, the most recent two years of case law were
researched in the West regional and federal reporter systems
using the West Key Numbers applicable to notice and oral
changes. A total of eleven cases were reviewed. The
process consisted of: 1) identifying the criteria used to
decide each dispute, 2) determining the precedence of
consideration (if any), and 3) comparing the court decision

to that obtained by follo">i'ing the rules summarized in
Figures 2 and 4.
Table 11 summarizes the criteria used in each of the
eleven cases. The fact that a court decision did not
consider all the criteria is not surprising. The major
cases researched to formulate the rules rarely fully
explained the case lavi/ leading to the decisions. Table 11
shovjL's that no additional criteria u/ere applied. There vi-as
nothing substantial to suggest that the sequence or
hierarchy of criteria should be altered. Finally, by
applying the rules in the hierarchy presented in Figures 2
and 4, conclusions were reached matching those of the
courts. This additionally documents the consistency of the




The cases revieu/ed revealed no additional criteria are
necessary to ev'aluate notice or oral change order disputes.
Hou/ever, additional contractual issues may result in a
decision of no entitlement even if all the criteria have
been met.
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509 \.E.2ci 614. The case involved construction of a house
on property ouned by the Biggses.
The contract included the follou'ing pertinent
provisions
:
(1) payment of the contract price vjuas to be
made in three installments-the first payout u/hen
construction was under roof, the second payout u'hen the
trades vji-ere roughed in and the third and final payout
upon substantial completion of the building; (2)
Ambrose would comply ulth the Mechanics' Liens Act of
Illinois ( 111 . Rev. Stat . 1983, ch. 82, par .1 et seq .);...( 4
)
any extras must be evidenced in uriting, and any
adjustment to the contract price resulting from extras
sliall be determined by mutual agreement of the parties
before starting the work involved,^
The pu.rpose of the Mechanics' Liens Act is to protect the
owner from potential, valid subcontractor claims. This
protection is provided by a sworn contractor's statement
which lists names and addresses of the parties furnishing
materials and labor and the amount due prior to the owner
making payment to the contractor.
Construction began and the owner paid the first two
payments even though the contractor failed to comply with
the Mechanics' Liens Act requirement that a sworn
contractor's statement be provided prior to payment. In
evaluating, the court found that the Biggses were on site
nearly every day and that all the criteria for oral
modification of a written contract as described in the
Watson Lumber Co. v. Guennewig (1967), 226 N.E.2d 270, were
satisfied. Howei^er, the trial court determined that the
contractor could not recover for the extras because he
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failed to provide a contractor's statement in accordance
uith the Mechanics' Liens Act as required by another
contract provision. The court also ruled against the ovLTier
on their countersuit for delay damages. The owners
appealed
.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court decision
stating that failure to comply vx'ith the referenced state
statute barred the contractor from recovery for the extras.
The the contractor had satisfied all the criteria to
establish the existence of an oral change to the u-ritten
contract but was precluded from recovery for failing to
satisfy another contract requirement. The court
specifically noted that the ou/ner ' s first two payments did
not act as a u/aiver of the requirement since the contract is
subordinate to the law.
Similar ity Between Notice and Oral Change Order Disputes
The matrix in Table 11 shows that disputes involving
oral changes and notice often involve the same criteria.
This is understandable since one of the situations requiring
notice is that of extra work. In an extra work dispute, the
rule base (flowcharts) for oral change orders and notice
appear to merge. The considerations of owner direction and
owner prejudice mirror one other as follows:
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Ora l Change Notice
Requested by Ouner v^^^^
Ordered by Proper J^ Ou'ner Knovi'ledgeAuthority ^^"
Promise to Pay Add ' 1 Compensation
Add ' 1 Compensation Expected from
Contract
Prior Approval Timing of Notice
Vl'hile both situations are simultaneously studied, the
decision is referenced only to the oral change order dispute
for- extra u'ork. This implies that the oral change order
criteria have priority in disputes for extra work.
Logically if the ou/ner orders and agrees to pay for
extra work, owner notice is implicit.
Sll_Ga r and Convincing Evidence
Cases reviewed involving waiver of contract provisions
indicated that the party attempting to invoke the doctrine
of waiver had the burden of proof. One court in discussing
this burden of proof stated that evidence establishing
waiver beyond a reasonable doubt was not required but merely
a preponderance, a superiority of influence, of evidence to
support the assertion.
However, the Ohio Court of Appeals established a
different measurement of proof in the case of Frantz v. Van
Gunten. In that case the court quoted from the 18
Jurisprudence 3d (1980) 110, 111, Contracts, Section 205,
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ccncGrning orders for extras to be in UTiting:
That such a provision in a contract may be u/aivecl is
settled in Ohio... It is held, however, that such
stipulation being for the benefit of the emr)loyer,
proof of a u'aiver must either be in vi'riting or by such
clear and convincing evidence as to leave no reasonab]e
doubt about it. There is no presumption as to such a
u/aiver, and it has been stated that a mere
preponderance of evidence is not sufficient to
establish such a waiver.
2
The court then quoted the case of Cross v. Ledford
(195-4), 161 Ohio St. 469, 53 0.0. 361, 120 N . E . 2d 118 in
defining what constituted clear and convincing evidence.
Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or
degree of proof which is more than a mere
'preponderance of the evidence,' but not to the extent
of such certainty as is required 'beyond a reasonable
doubt' in criminal cases, and which will produce in the
mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction
as to the facts sought to be established .^
This is not an alteration to the criteria considered by
the courts; however, it does reflect that attitudes differ
among courts of various jurisdictions. The level of
evidence necessary to establish waiver is not easily




A review of eleven recent construction disputes
involving oral changes orders or notice confirmed that the
criteria presented in the previous chapters adequately
defines construction case law. These rules may not work in
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all situations, as contradictory decisions can undoubtedly
be found. Hovi-ever , these rules should be correct in the





Parties are generally allou/ed to autonomously form
contracts based upon mutually agreeable terms. The courts
strictly enforce those terms unless they violate established
principles of statutory lavi;. The courts treat contract
notice and change order technical requirements subordinate
to the laa'. The courts often state that absent u/aiver, the
contract requirements u'ill be strictly enforced. This is a
very broad definition of u/aiver. A much narrou/er definition
is used in this paper, only including instances u/here the
acts or conduct of the parties have resulted in u/aiver.
The more than seventy cases reviewed represented a
sampling from most jurisdictions. The breakdou/n is as
fol lou's :
Jur j sdiction Type of QuTier
Federal - 25 Federal - 15
State - 45 State - 4
Board of Contract Local - 8
Appeals - 4 Private - 47
Substantial consistency exists in case lau/ involving oral
change orders and notice disputes.
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Application of This Research
OraJ^ Change Orders
In contract disputes involving oral change orders,
compliance uith either of two criteria prevents enforcement
of the uritten change order requirement. The first relates
to contract formation principles. The second concerns
conduct of the parties and the question of u/aiver. Of these
tuc criteria, it is not readily apparent vx'hich the courts
considers first. This paper presents the contract formation
principles as having precedence. A party establishes a
firmer dispute foundation by demonstrating adherence to
contract formation principles rather than first seeking to
find u/ays to escape conformance with the formal contract
requirements
.
When confronted with a situation of oral change order,
the initial determination is to ascertain if the operative
clauses require a written directive. In most instances, a
written directive will be required; however, where standard
contract forms are not used, it is possible that a contract
"loophole" may exist so as to negate the requirement.
Assuming a written directive is required, a review of
regulations and statutes should follow. Where regulations
require written directives, signed by specific persons, or
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presented in a specific manner, contractors 'vi'ill not be
compensated unless there is full compliance.
The next criterion is to determine if the essential
elements of a contract are present. An offer and acceptance
and consideration are the two most important elements
relative to oral changes. The ouner must know of the
problem, and must know that the contractor expects
com.pensation . Oral directives are valid expressions of an
offer and acceptance. However, the owner must know that he
is requesting work that will require additional
com.pensation. An implied or express promise to pay cannot
be rescinded later.
Authority rests with specific individuals. However,
apparent authority can be extended to others. Importantly,
this cannot be done without some expression of intent by the
person possessing the authority. Expressions can be actual
or implied. Knowledge that unauthorized changes are being
made accompanied by no effort to stop the unauthorized
activities is paramount to conveying apparent authority.
If the eleiments of contract formation are not followed,
the only recourse available to a contractor is to show that
the requirement has been waived. An example of waiver is an




When confronted a'j th a situation of notice, the initial
determination is which of the notice provision governs and
U-'hat technical requirements apply. Often one situation can
embrace more than one provision. Caution advises
referencing all that might be eventually be applicable but
ensuring the most stringent technical requirement is
satisfied. When standard contract forms are not used,
avenues of recovery can often be found in spite of
noncompliance but these are less frequent as standard
contract forms become more u'idely used.
Assuming written notice is required, review of
governing statutes and regulations should follow.
Noncompliance with statutory requirements precludes
recovery. Actions of the parties, contract requirements are
both subordinate to the law.
The next consideration should be whether the intent of
the requirement has been satisfied. The owner must have
actual, implied or imputed knowledge of the situation. In
addition, he must be aware that the contractor expects
additional compensation. Finally, the owner must be
informed in time to prevent prejudice of his contractual
rights. If these criteria have been met, the intent of the
notice requirement has been satisfied.
If the intent has not been satisfied, the only
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available option of recovery is that of u-aiver. An example
is uhcre the owner by his repeated vi/ords or conduct has
con\.-eyed to the contractor that the notice requirements u'ill
not be enforced.
Tu/o locations in Figure 2 titled "Attitude of the
Court" indicate that some courts have recognized other
considerations. These have not been consistently applied by
the courts and should be used u.'ith caution.
In situations where both notice and written change
orders are required, the primary considerations are the
contract formation principles. If the ouTier orders and
agrees to pay for extra work, owner notice is implicitly
satisfied
.
Additional cases reviewed since completion of the
research include Moorhead Construction Co. v. City of Grand
Forks (508 F . 2d 1008), T. Lippia and Son, Inc. v. Jorson
(342 A. 2d 910), and U/atson Lumber Company v. Lloyd Mouser
(333 N.E.2d 19). These decisions further confirm the rules
and flowcharts developed.
Relevancy of This Research
The need for this research is evidenced by the
treatment of the case of State of Indiana v. Omega Painting,
Inc. (463 N.E.2d 287) by Michael C. Loulakis in the Legal
Trends column "Contract Notice Requirements" of the January
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1985 edition of Civil Engineering . The column indicates
that the decision evidences a return to strict application
of the contract notice requirements, the Plumley doctrine.
The case involved the sandblasting and painting of a
bridge structure. Problems arose u/hen the state changed
inspectors. The new inspector required more blasting than
the contractor felt necessary to attain the specified
finish. The contract contained the provision: "If the
Contractor deems that additional compensation U'ill be due
him for work or material not clearly covered in the contract
or not ordered as extra u/ork, he shall notify the Engineer
in writing. . .
"
Neither the ou/ner nor the contractor asserted the
change was classified as extra work, but the contractor
stated that the owner somehow modified the contract. The
contractor also failed to introduce evidence to show oviTier
waiver of the provision.
The case is complex and confusing, contained limited
information and the issues of oral change order and notice
were inseparably intertwined. The conclusion drawn by Mr.
Loulakis is misleading.
Such a case cannot be used solely as a basis to
e^'idence return to the Plumley doctrine. A sampling of
significant cases must be made and the body of case law
evaluated to make such conclusions. By grasping a single
case, authors can portray the courts as capricious and
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incongruous in their decisions ahile missing the remarkable
overall consistency.
Areas for Additional Research
Some areas of apparent difference do deserve
further research. These are briefly discussed belovji'.
E ffect of Breach
TvjL'o cases dealt with the issue of breach but
reached different conclusions about the enforceability of
notice requirements. While one court stated that breach by
the owner released the contractor from that requirement,
another court stated that satisfaction of the technical
requirements by the contractor u/as prerequisite to his
maintenance of the breach action. Hou; does the court view
the effect of breach?
Prior Consideration of Claim
Two cases dealt with the issue of prior consideration
of a dispute by the owner on the its merits. One court
indicated that prior consideration by the owner prevented
invoking the technical requirements of the notice provision
as a bar to recovery. Another court stated that once either
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party appeals, the prior decision by the ou'ner is voided and
has no effect on the decision. That court further stated
that prior consideration should not bar enforcement of
contract notice requirement as a defense. Mou.' does the
court vieu' the effect of prior consideration of a claim cjn
its merits?
Lev el of Evi dence to Establ ish U/ai ver
The level of evidence required to establish u/aiver was
(liffei'ent between two cases. Where one court only required
a preponderance of evidence, another court required clear
and convincing evidence. This question is more subjective
in nature and may be more difficult to determine.
Constructive Change or Waiver
The courts appeared to use the terms waiver and
constructive change interchangeably. Further definition and
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